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Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
2002, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
has passed rules that it promises will make corpo-
rate accounting more transparent. In fact, its
revised Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
havemade itdifficult for investors—orevenCEOs—
to understand a company’s financial report.
The first step in the wrong direction came
when FASB mandated that companies list
“intangibles” such as “goodwill” as corporate
assets, artificially inflating balance sheets. After
that, FASB meddled with the revenue recogni-
tion rules, in some cases not allowing companies
to report revenue from cash payments received
from a customer for a delivered product. Finally,
and worst by far, FASB mandated punitive and
nonsensical rules for so-called expensing of
stock options.
These accounting burdens, combinedwith the
onerous yet ineffective mandates of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, are starting to take a real toll on
American businesses and markets. In 2007, only
$8.5 billion or 7.7 percent of the total $109 billion
in issuances of Initial Public Offerings were
launched on U.S. stock exchanges, down from
60.8 percent a decade ago.
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I first noticed the misleading nature of
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles a
few years ago when an investor called to com-
plain about the small amount of cash on our
balance sheet. Since we had plenty of cash, I
decided to quickly quote the correct figures
fromour latest financial report. But tomy sur-
prise, I could not tell how much cash we had
either. With its usual—and almost always
incorrect—claimofmaking financial reporting
“more transparent,” the Financial Accounting
Standards Board had made it difficult for a
CEO to read his own financial report.
FASB is a group of seven theoretical
accountants based in Norwalk, Connecticut.
Its website shows that no FASB member ever
started or ran a successful business and that
only one member has even held a senior posi-
tion in a prominent public company other
than an accounting firm. Yet, FASB mandates
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
that corporations must use to report to their
shareholders. The Securities and Exchange
Commission enforces FASB mandates with
the threat of criminal prosecution.
AlthoughGAAPreportsbecamemore com-
plex and less transparent during the 1990s, by
2001 GAAP accounting was good enough to
enable companies to report accurately, both
internally for control purposes and externally
to shareholders. Since then the FASB-mandat-
ed GAAP reports have become nearly useless. I
no longer bother to read the financial reports
of companies I follow because I would literally
need an analyst to decipher them forme.
One big step in the wrong direction came
when FASB mandated that after an acquisi-
tion, companies list “intangibles” such as
“goodwill” as corporate assets, artificially
inflating balance sheets. After that, FASB
meddledwith the revenue recognition rules, in
some cases not allowing companies to report
revenue from cash payments received from a
customer for a delivered product. Finally, and
worse by far, FASB mandated punitive and
nonsensical rules for so-called expensing of
stock options.
These accounting burdens combined with
the onerous yet ineffective mandates of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act are starting to take a real
toll on American businesses and markets. In
2007 only $8.5 billion, or 7.7 percent of the
total $109 billion in issuances of Initial Public
Offerings, was launched on U.S. stock
exchanges, down from 60.8 percent a decade
ago. FASB rarely considers the bureaucratic
burdens it imposes on companies. And it’s get-
ting worse. Duncan Niederauer, the CEO of
the New York Stock Exchange, reports that as
of July 1, 2008, “only four sponsor-backed
deals (those with either venture capital or pri-
vate equity investors) raised a mere U.S. $1.7
billon,” down 90 percent from the 2007 fig-
ures. The increased regulation burden makes
it less attractive for venture capitalists to fund
small startup companies—an economic disas-
ter for SiliconValley, themost prolific produc-
er of America’s technology successes. On July
7, the president of the National Venture
Capital Association, Mark Heesen, addressed
the same IPO drought by stating, “We need to
put regulators, legislators, presidential candi-
dates and the private sector on notice that this
situation represents a serious problem that
will have long-reaching economic implica-
tions if not addressed. We view this quarter as
the canary in the coal mine.”
The case of my company’s confusing cash
report was explained by a GAAP accounting
rule thatmandated spreading the liquid assets
onourbalance sheet into three categories: cash
and cash equivalents; short-term investments;
and “other assets,” a category containing both
liquid investments, like Intel stock, and illiquid
investments, like the stock of a startup compa-
ny.My company’s actual cash position is infer-
able from our official 172-page 10-K report,
but only by those willing to dig into the 74
pages of footnotes. Few investors would have
the time to do that exercise for one stock, let
alone a portfolio. Consequently, I present the
first of nine rules on the unfortunate realities







CEO to read his
own financial
report.
do not allow the average investor to know howmuch
cash a company has.
Mymost recent encounter with inaccurate
GAAP reporting came as I prepared to write
the President’s Letter forCypress’s 2007 annu-
al report by reading our SEC-mandated Proxy
Statement, which said that I had earned $11.3
million in 2007—a number that seemed not
only wrong to me, but wrong by a factor of
two. That night, my wife and domestic CFO
reported to me that I had taken home $4.7
million in 2007: $1.5 million in salary and
bonus; a $1.2 million special stock bonus
awarded for the success of our solar energy
company, SunPower; and a $2.0 million gain
from exercising a decade-old 1997 stock
option grant that was about to expire. For a
tiebreaker, I went to our tax department the
next day to find out howmuch they thought I
earned. Both they and the IRS said I earned
$4.7 million in 2007—in direct contradiction
to our Proxy Statement.
How did GAAP accounting distort my
reported 2007 income?One error comes from
the accounting for my retirement account,
which contains tax-deferred income I earned
and saved overmy career. The account grewby
$1.7million in 2007 because it held stock that
appreciated during the year. I neither own nor
can borrow against that retirement account,
but GAAP and SEC rules required that the
$1.7 million gain in it be reported as my 2007
personal income. Rule 2: Old income can be
reported two times—ormore.
My apparent 2007 income was also inflat-
ed by the phantom income I did not receive
that is attributable tomy company’s having to
“expense” stockoptions that vestedduring the
year. I neither bought any options at a dis-
count nor sold any for a gain. I simply received
the right to buy some options. If I died or my
company performed poorly, the potential val-
ue in those unexercised options would never
be realized, yet my company was forced to
declare them as actual 2007 income for me
and a “loss” for the company.
According toFASB, I “earned” an extra $4.9
million in 2007 without putting a penny in
the bank because at option granting, the
GAAP rules simplymandated thatmyunvested
shares had a built-in gain of at least 60 percent
of their face value, which I received as the
options vested. The GAAP rules further
required that one-fifth of that unpaid “gain”
be reported as income each year. This consti-
tutes another supposedly transparent FASB
accounting rule:Hypothetical income is calcu-
lated on a stock option that an employee does
not own and is counted against corporate
earnings. Moreover, that one-time calculation
of CEO pay (and corporate loss) is locked in
for five years—even if the stock goes down and
the options are never even exercised.
Of course, the IRSwould never dare taxme
on the phantom income without losing the
case in tax court. The errors and misrepresen-
tations can get extreme. Ian Cockwell, CEO of
Brookfield Homes, was reported as “earning”
a negative $2.3 million in 2007 in his compa-
ny’s proxy statement. It seems that someof the
“income” from prior years, which he never
took home, did not materialize according to
FASB’s one-size-fits-all formula and had to be
subtracted from his 2007 reported income.
Rule 3: Due to the faulty logic embedded in GAAP
stock option expensing rules, companies overreport
their CEOs’ earnings and, worse yet, underreport
corporate earnings. In many cases, the errors are
large.
In 2001, presumably to prevent a few com-
panies from generating the appearance of
growth through serial acquisitions, FASB
decided to make acquisitions less financially
appealing by implementing the deeply flawed
concept of forcing acquiring companies to put
intangible assets—assets that do not exist and
have no value—on their balance sheets. Here is
anexampleof the theorybehind thisnonsense:
When one company acquires another, say for
$2 billion, the acquiring company puts the val-
ue, say $1 billion, of the acquired company’s
real assets on its books. In this example, the
acquiring company would then be required to
put the remainder of the $2 billion acquisition
price on its books as a $1 billion intangible
asset. With this FASB edict, the real assets of
U.S. corporations—cash, buildings, trucks and
the like—were mixed deceptively with intangi-
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ble assets on balance sheets. Rule 4: A company
can be broke but still appear to have big assets.
In theoriginal versionof thishallucinogenic
accounting rule, the intangible assets were
“amortized,” taken as quarterly losses in equal
amounts over a period such as five years. Thus,
in the example above, the “amortization of
intangibles” createdaphony loss for the acquir-
er of $200 million per year for five years. What
do you get when youmerge two identical com-
panies, each like the one described above—val-
ued at $2 billion, with $1 billion in real assets
and $100million per year in profit?Don’t say a
company valued at $4 billion with $2 billion in
real assets and $200 million in profit. The
answer, accordingtoFASB, isacompanyvalued
at $4billionwith $3billion in assets—one-third
of them intangible—and zero profit.
Fortunately, the mystery losses caused by
amortized intangibles led to the rise of report-
ing non-GAAP earnings, in which the GAAP
phantom-asset distortions were excluded
from otherwise nominal GAAP reporting for
acquisitions. Today, my company and many
other publicly tradedAmerican companies are
judged by analysts and investors according to
non-GAAP earnings (approximating pre-2001
GAAP earnings).
The final saga in the Alice in Wonderland
“intangibles” accounting tale occurred in 2001,
when I testified at a hearing of the Senate com-
mittee, which was forced to deal with the
uproar over the evaporating GAAP earnings of
acquisitive companies. Since no one was sworn
in at that strange hearing, no one had to bear
responsibility for the outcome, a compromise
that kept intangible “assets” on the books.
However, the amortization of intangibles was
dropped in favor of an annual evaluation.Now,
oncea year, all companies are required to review
their goodwill assets—to review the accounting
residuals of acquired companies that ceased to
exist years before—and debate whether the
evanescent assets have gone down in value, cre-
ating a phantom loss inGAAP earnings.
Institutional investors and analysts have
always ignored this folly, but FASBmandates
the foolish and expensive yearly exercise of
valuing things that don’t exist. And, as is true
with most government mandates, there is
now a camp following of firms which, for a
bargain price of tens of thousands of dollars,
will provide an opinion on the value of—
nothing. Rule 5: Beware of the balance sheet, it
contains things that do not exist.
Companies can fund themselves by bor-
rowingmoney or by selling stock. The cost of
selling stock is dilution, the loss of earnings
per share (EPS) due to a rising share count.
The cost of borrowing money is interest
expense that lowers EPS. One preferred form
of financing for technology companies is the
convertible debenture, a hybrid of debt and a
stock option, in which investors lend money
to companies. At the end of a typical five-year
convertible debenture, the borrowing compa-
ny must pay back the loan in cash with inter-
est—or, alternatively, if the company’s share
price is above a “conversion price,” pay off the
debt with stock at that price. If the share
price at settlement is well above the conver-
sion price, the investor has the option to take
stock and make a significant capital gain.
The accounting rule used to compute the
cost of a typical convertible debenture on its
issuer’s financial statements is conservative,
but reasonable. Companies calculate their
quarterly earnings both for the case of paying
back the convertible debenture in stock and
the case of paying it back in cash—and report
the less favorable outcome.By contrast, FASB’s
treatment of employee stock options is out-
right punitive. It requires companies to report
employeeoptions in anunrealizableworst-case
scenario—both as EPS dilution and as an
expense that reduces EPS further. It seems that
FASB has gone out of its way tomake employ-
ee stock options unaffordable by double-
counting their cost. Most unfortunately, this
change has causedmany SiliconValley compa-
nies to reduce or eliminate stock options given
to rank-and-file engineers. Rule 6: The profits of
companies that grant employee options are often
grossly understated by GAAP rules because of the
double counting of stock option losses.Without a deep
dive into complicatedGAAPreports, investors canno









In a recent review of potential acquisition
candidates, I noted an obvious error in the
financial analysis of one very good target com-
pany. Its financial statements showed the com-
pany nearly breaking even, when I knew that it
consistentlyproduced20percentpretaxprofit.
The disconnect came from the fact that the
young MBA doing the analysis used GAAP
financial statements that included all the
accounting distortions described above. We
adjourned the meeting until a useful analysis
couldbe completed.Rule7: If a long-tenuredCEO
of a New York Stock Exchange technology company
cannot decide whether to buy a company based on its
GAAP financials, neither can investors.
GAAP accounting even misrepresents the
revenue that some companies report. One
would think that if a company receives a cash
payment for delivering a product, it would rec-
ognize revenue and profit, and pay taxes. Not
so. As a board member reviewing financial
statementsof a startupSiliconValleydata com-
munications company, I became very confused
by the company’s reported revenue, which was
factors below the company’s actual shipments.
The GAAP accounting theory behind this
problem is explained in the following exam-
ple: If a company ships a product for $1 mil-
lion andwarranties the product for five years,
there is a possibility that the product will
have to be repaired or replaced. Under GAAP
accounting, the result might be stated by
reporting $700,000 in revenue immediately
and $300,000 in revenue over time as the
product warranty period winds down; for
example, $60,000 in revenue per year for five
years. Thus, the last $60,000 in revenue for a
system shipped in 2008 might not be report-
ed until 2013.
Unless returns and warranty expenses are
significant relative to revenue, the previous
and time-tested method for revenue recogni-
tion is to record revenue when a system is
shipped and to handle returns as they occur.
Thismethodgivesmuchmore realistic picture
of a company’s performance to investors—and
to management. Under FASB’s “improved”
system, companies must keep two revenue
records to know what is actually going on
internally. While the splitting of revenue may
make sense to theoretical accountants, consid-
er the practical burden it puts on companies.
Think about shipping hundreds of different
products with different warranty terms to
thousands of customers with many different
contracts. In that environment, just calculat-
ing “revenue” can take weeks for a large group
of accountants. Furthermore, once a company
has built up a large reservoir of deferred rev-
enue, it canhave a real revenue problem that is
obscured by the fact that it is still reporting
revenue from products shipped years before.
Rule 8: The investor often cannot decipher the true
revenue of high-tech systems companies by reading
their GAAP profit-and-loss statement.
GAAP accounting rules and the Sarbanes-
Oxley mandates are no longer just a source of
colorful stories; they are starting to cause tan-
gible harm to American businesses and mar-
kets. With the IPO revenue hurdle rising
because of bureaucratic costs, venture capital-
ists are now focusing on mega-startups that
can better bear the costs of government-man-
dated bureaucracy. Unfortunately, small star-
tups are a crucial component of the Silicon
Valley economic model—one that has consis-
tently prevailed over old-line companies in
Japan and Europe.
Silicon Valley always creates “too many”
innovative companies in each new technology
field—and later consolidates the intellectual
property and people of those companies into
dominant companies, like Cisco Systems, the
world’s leading data communications systems
company. The Valley’s winning formula is to
develop new technologies in many competing
startups, rather than the less effective practice
of developing technology in the form of a few
big projects in one or two big companies.
FASB is now forcing Silicon Valley down the
big-company path. Small companies with
great ideas often die unfunded. Rule 9: Despite
its theater of public hearings, FASB rarely considers
the bureaucratic burdens it imposes on companies
and seems incapable of understanding the impact its
utopian accounting schemes have onmarkets.
The Wall Street of Silicon Valley is Sand








tens of billions of venture capital dollars on
the way to Stanford University, the epicenter
of SiliconValley. Thepremier venture firmson
SandHill Road always have all themoney they
need. Indeed, in years past,many of themhave
returned funds to investors because they felt
there were not enough good investment
opportunities. Thus, the GAAP rules that dis-
courage the venture funding of smaller com-
panies directly harm Silicon Valley’s economy.
Our company’s 215 accountants and I live
daily with indecipherable GAAP financial
reports and draconian Sarbanes-Oxley man-
dates. I have become firmly convinced that
we have given too much power to a board of
seven accountants who have a tendency to
regulate to death the wealth-creating compa-
nies that they themselves are incapable of cre-
ating—or even understanding.
WhenWall Street is no longer the center of
the financial world and Sand Hill Road no
longer rules venture capital, all Americanswill
be harmed—andwewill wishwe haddemand-
ed simple common sense from the counter-
productive bureaucrats who control our
financial system.
Silicon Valley changes continuously. Over
time it became Personal Computer Valley,
WorkstationValley, BiotechValley,Communi-
cations Valley, and Search Engine Valley. We
are now becoming Renewable Energy Valley.
This place runs on free markets, abundant
venture capital, and the unbridled entrepre-
neurial spirit of smart, hard-working, well-
educated people.
The underlying mechanism of our success
is a new economic social contract, under
which the economic pie is broadly distributed
to rank-and-file engineers, who can earn life-
changing wealth from the stock options. The
CEOs of Silicon Valley successes like Google
often brag about the dozens, or even hun-
dreds, of millionaires created by their compa-
nies. This spreading of wealth drives a differ-
ent work ethic in Silicon Valley.
A job in a startup company is a personal
mission, not a paycheck. Computers turn the
lights off in our buildings at 7:00 p.m. to
remind our employees that it’s time to go
home. It deeply angers me that government
lawyers and naive theoretical accountants
have been allowed to impair the economic
miracle that democratized the silicon chip, the
personal computer, and the Internet.
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